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THE END OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE  
BEHAVIOR TOO? 
Brad Finney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is much debate among legal and business scholars and 
practitioners concerning whether maximizing shareholder wealth is a 
principle that has truly been codified in the United States, as well as the 
resulting impact that the codification of this principle could have on cor-
porations. Recent decisions, such as eBay v. Newmark,1 and even a case 
decided nearly one hundred years ago, Dodge v. Ford,2 have created confu-
sion resulting in various analyses and opinions regarding these issues.3 
Although the legal debate continues regarding whether corporations and 
directors of those corporations must make all decisions with the aim of 
maximizing shareholder wealth, shareholder primacy and the maximiza-
tion of shareholder wealth remain foundational corporate doctrines 
taught in business and law schools around the country.4 This corporate 
doctrine is, and will continue to be, the underlying basis that informs 
most decisions made for corporations by legal advisors, directors, and 
other decision makers.5 
Part II of this comment provides a view of the education provid-
ed in business and law schools concerning the goal of corporations, i.e. 
                                                      
* Brad Finney is scheduled to graduate from the University of Tennessee College of 
Law in 2018 and will join Norton Rose Fulbright’s Houston office in September of 
2018. 
1 See Ebay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
2 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
3 Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate 
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 439–40, 444–451 (2013); Jessica Chu, Filling A Nonex-
istent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 163–181 (2012). 
4 Darrell West, The Purpose of the Corporation in Business and Law School Curricula, GOV-
ERNANCE STUD. AT BROOKINGS 1, 2, 10–12 (July 2011). 
5  See id.  
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how that goal—the maximization of shareholder wealth—has become a 
foundational corporate doctrine for many attorneys and businesspeople, 
and the impact the combination of that goal and benefit corporations has 
on deciding whether a corporation should take socially responsible ac-
tion.  
Part III of this comment examines the extent to which maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth is taught as a principle of corporations in business 
and law schools and discusses a recent survey of the specific corporate 
principles that are taught. It concludes by discussing the impact that 
those teachings have had on students that have gone on to become at-
torneys, businesspeople, and key decision makers.  
 Part IV of this comment discusses the influence that the prolifer-
ation of state statutes allowing for the formation of benefit corporations 
has on traditional corporations and its legal counsel, directors, and other 
key decision makers. It then discusses the possibility that decision mak-
ers of traditional corporations will become more averse to taking part in 
socially responsible actions as a result of the rise of benefit corporations.  
II. MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH IS TAUGHT AS A NORM IN 
BUSINESS AND LAW SCHOOL 
Over the last several decades, as free-market economists from 
the University of Chicago and their ideas became more prominent, there 
has been a fundamental change in the way business and law schools 
viewed and taught students about the purpose of corporations.6 Accord-
ing to these economists, “economic analysis revealed the proper purpose 
of the public corporation clearly, and that purpose was to make money 
for its dispersed shareholder[s].”7 Further, professors teaching this “new-
school” of thought declared that any action taken by agents of a corpora-
tion that pursued a goal outside of maximizing shareholder wealth was 
improper as the action was outside of the proper purpose of corpora-
                                                      
6 See Lynn A. Stout, The Problem of Corporate Purpose, 48 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD. 
1, 2 (June 2012).  
7 Id. 
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tions.8 Schools shifted accordingly to emphasize stockholder primacy 
and the maximization of shareholder wealth as fundamental principles of 
business and corporate law.9 Further, business schools and law schools 
deemphasized the theory that a corporation’s purpose is to provide em-
ployees with well-paying jobs, satisfy customer demands, be a good cor-
porate citizen, and provide a return to investors.10  
This shift in focus has now impacted generations of students, 
businesspeople, and attorneys as undergraduate business students, 
MBAs, and law students typically learn through their respective school-
ing that the mantra of maximizing shareholder wealth is a standard busi-
ness practice that must inform business decisions.11 Mr. Steve Denning, a 
lawyer who worked at the World Bank for several decades, stated that 
the idea of maximizing shareholder wealth “is now deeply embedded in 
the basic economics that is taught in business schools and economics 
faculties around the world.”12 Mr. Denning studied and analyzed the 
fundamental principles of managerial economics—a theory of economics 
that is taught in many undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools 
and the resulting implications that this theory has had on business prac-
tices.13 As part of this study, Mr. Denning examined several of the best-
selling course textbooks on economics and discovered that all the course 
textbooks are “built on” the doctrines that corporations must maximize 
shareholder wealth and that “the whole job of the manager is to maxim-
ize profit for the company and its shareholders.”14 Specifically, “the very 
                                                      
8 See id. at 1–3.  
9 See id.; West, supra note 4, at 1. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. at 1, 2, 10–12. 
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foundation of managerial economics is . . . maximizing shareholder val-
ue.”15 In-fact, the best-selling books assume that the corporate manager’s 
end-goal is to maximize the profits of the corporation’s shareholders.16   
In 2011, Mr. Darrel M. West, the vice president and director of 
Governance Studies and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in 
Washington D.C., examined business and law school curriculum to de-
termine which perspectives and guiding principles are taught in Ameri-
ca’s higher education system.17 Further, Mr. West set out to determine 
student perceptions about the role business is supposed to play in socie-
ty.18  
Upon interviewing professors and faculty members at top busi-
ness and law schools, analyzing the curriculum taught at these schools, 
reviewing course syllabi, and reviewing survey data of students’ views 
and perceptions, Mr. West came to several conclusions.19 First, in Ameri-
can business and law schools, great emphasis is put on the theory that 
the purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth—this 
emphasis was especially acute in law schools that cover the purpose of a 
corporation.20 Second, Mr. West found that after completing business 
school, students are far more likely to view maximizing shareholder 
wealth as the paramount focus of a corporation compared to when they 
started their education.21 Third, few business or law schools require 
courses that provide broader perspectives on the role or purpose of cor-
                                                      
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 West, supra note 4, at 1. 
18 Id. at 1–2. 
19 Id. at 1, 3. 
20 Id. at 2, 4, 10–12.  
21 Id. at 2, 14. 
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porations, and this lack of required education has impacted not only the 
business community but society at large.22  
Specifically, Mr. West found that, in regard to law schools, “[t]he 
dominant ‘law and economics’ conception taught in many schools em-
phasizes profit maximization and enhancing shareholder value.”23 For 
example, Mr. Michael Kausner, a professor at Stanford Law School, in-
structs his students that the purpose of a corporation is to maximize 
shareholder wealth and teaches corporate social responsibility only in the 
context of accruing goodwill for the corporation, which can result in an 
overall increase in shareholder wealth.24  
Further, Mr. West discovered in his research that many business 
schools added corporate governance classes to its curriculum as a result 
of the many corporate scandals that occurred in the early 2000’s.25 How-
ever, Mr. West found that these courses often did not actually address 
the purpose of corporations and the role that corporations should hold 
in society, but instead tended to focus on the arduous decisions individu-
als and organizations may face.26 Mr. West appears to largely attribute 
this focus to business professors who are already indoctrinated into the 
shareholder wealth maximization theory.27 For example, some professors 
at top business schools vehemently argue that teaching and discussing 
the idea that corporations should sometimes act in the interest of the 
public is “fundamentally flawed.”28 In fact, Mr. Aneel Karnani, a profes-
sor at Michigan’s Ross School of Business, stated that the concept of 
corporations acting in the interest of the public could have detrimental 
                                                      
22 West, supra note 4, at 2, 5, 7–12.  
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Id. at 11–12. 
25 Id. at 4. 
26 West, supra note 4, at 5. 
27 See id. at 1, 5–6. 
28 Id. at 6. 
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effects on corporations since “in most cases, doing what’s best for socie-
ty means sacrificing profits.”29 
Last, Mr. West analyzed an Aspen Institute study conducted of 
students at fifteen business programs over three years.30 Among other 
questions, this study asked students what was the paramount function of 
a corporation.31 The study revealed that the vast majority of these “stu-
dents believe the primary purpose of a corporation is to maximize share-
holder value[.]”32 Further, these “students believe [maximizing share-
holder wealth] is how current corporate leaders behave when they are 
making decisions.”33  
Ms. Lynn Stout, Distinguished Professor of Corporate and Busi-
ness Law at Cornell School of Law, summarized the impact that business 
and law schools have had on societal views on the goal of corporations.34 
Professor Stout stated that “[m]ost people today would say corporations 
have but one proper purpose: maximizing their shareholders’ wealth” 
and that doing things that positively impact other stakeholders like 
“providing good jobs—are viewed as legitimate business ends only to the 
extent they increase ‘shareholder value.’”35 Professor Stout concluded 
that “[t]his view prevails in large part because it’s what is taught in our 
nation’s classrooms.”36  
                                                      
29 Id. at 6 n.14 (quoting Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility,” 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 2010). 
30 Id. at 14. 
31 West, supra note 4, at 14. 
32 Id. at 18.  
33 Id.  
34 Stout, supra note 6, at 1–2 (2012). 
35 Id. at 1. 
36 Id. 
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The focus of business and law schools in regard to the purpose 
of corporations has drastically changed over the last several decades.37 
Business and law schools now instruct students that maximizing share-
holder wealth is a fundamental principle of corporations and that key 
decision makers and legal advisors should follow this tenet.38 This in-
struction has had a tremendous impact on the corporate environment as 
maximizing shareholder wealth has become a standard principle that in-
forms people making business and legal decisions while advising corpo-
rations and their key decision makers.39 
III. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS MAKE KEY DECISION MAKERS AT  
TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS MORE AVERSE TO  
APPROVING CSR ACTIVITY 
Part II illustrates what business and law students have been 
taught over the last several decades—maximizing shareholder wealth is 
the paramount goal of traditional corporations, and that this mantra has 
become a foundational corporate doctrine. This section argues that be-
cause business people already view corporate decisions from a lens of 
maximizing shareholder wealth, creating new structures like benefit cor-
porations that authorize socially responsible actions and a viewpoint to-
wards other stakeholders will make legal counsel, directors, and other key 
decision makers in traditional corporations even more averse to consid-
ering all stakeholders and taking socially responsible actions. This distinc-
tion reinforces the principle that traditional corporations should maxim-
ize shareholder wealth.  
With the advent and proliferation of benefit corporations, the 
specific statutory language that grants the ability for organizations to 
form as benefit corporations and the repeated mantra by journalists, 
scholars, and businesspeople of benefit corporations as corporations that 
“do good,” it appears that if a corporation wants to engage in socially 
                                                      
37 See West, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
38 Id. at 17–18; see Denning, supra note 12. 
39 See West, supra note 4, at 1, 17–18. 
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responsible actions, the corporation must first reorganize as a benefit 
corporation.40  
Many states have passed statutes that allow for the formation of 
benefit corporations.41 Some state statutes allowing for the formation of 
benefit corporations require the name of all benefit corporations to in-
clude the term “benefit corporation” or a similar variation.42 This name 
requirement provides immediate differentiation between benefit corpora-
tions and traditional corporations, which allows consumers and the pub-
lic to easily distinguish corporations that are considering goals outside of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. This differentiation likely impacts the 
mindset of key corporate decision makers and advisors by reaffirming 
the proper goal of traditional corporations—maximizing shareholder 
wealth, and benefit corporations—considering action that benefits socie-
ty.  
As benefit corporations have gained popularity, and states have 
enacted statutes allowing for them, there has been an inundation of pub-
lished works that discuss benefit corporations, including the purpose of 
this new entity type. Newspapers, magazines, and online articles, as well 
as scholarly works with titles like “With a Public Benefit Corporation, 
Profit and Good Karma Can Coexist[,]” “A Benefit Corporation Can 
Have a Positive Impact on the World -- and Still Make a Profit[,]” “Pub-
lic benefit corporations: A new option for Minnesota companies that do 
good[,]” “The Benefit Corporation: A Tool For Building A Sustainable 
Brand[,]” and “Creating a class of ‘do good’ companies” make it clear 
that many mainstream business publications view benefit corporations as 
distinct from traditional corporations since benefit corporations can “do 
                                                      
40 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1-502(a)(2); Gene Bulmash, A Benefit Corpo-
ration Can Have a Positive Impact on the World, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252259. 
41 Ben Schiller, Should Your Company Be A Benefit Corporation, A B Corp, Or What?, FAST 
COMPANY (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3069192/should-my-com-
pany-be-a-benefit-corporation-a-b-corp-or-what.  
42 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1-502(a)(2). 
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good.”43 These publications also likely influence the overall mindset of 
key corporation decision makers and advisors by increasing the apparent 
differentiation between these two entities. For example, when stating 
why Warby Parker eschewed the traditional corporate form, one of 
Warby Parker’s cofounders, Neil Blumenthal, stated “[w]e wanted to 
build a business that could make profits. But we also wanted to build a 
business that did good in the world.”44  
States’ statutory language requiring differentiation in the name of 
the corporation along with business publications and scholarly articles 
declaring that benefit corporations are for corporations that “do good” 
have the combined effect of further reinforcing the principle that tradi-
tional corporations must always maximize shareholder wealth. Essential-
ly, among for-profit companies, benefit corporations likely create a bina-
ry view for decision makers—traditional corporations exist to maximize 
shareholder wealth and prohibit any action that does not do so, including 
socially responsible actions; benefit corporations are the proper structure 
for corporations that want to engage in socially responsible actions.45 
This reinforces the mantra that traditional corporations must attempt to 
always maximize shareholder wealth because if a traditional corporation 
                                                      
43Tim Howes, With a Public Benefit Corporation, Profit and Good Karma Can Coexist, ENTRE-
PRENEUR MAGAZINE (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/ arti-
cle/253059#; Gene Bulmash, A Benefit Corporation Can Have a Positive Impact on the World 
-- and Still Make a Profit, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252259; Sarah Duniway & Julia Offenhauser, 
Public benefit corporations: A new option for Minnesota companies that do good, THE STAR TRIB-
UNE (Feb. 6, 2015), www.startribune.com/ public-benefit-corporations-a-new-option-
for-minnesota-companies-that-do-good/291104881/; Jen Friedman, The Benefit Corpora-
tion: A Tool For Building A Sustainable Brand, CMO BY ADOBE (April 22, 2015), 
http://www.cmo.com/opinion/articles/2015/4/20/the-benefit-corporation-a-tool-
for-building-a-sustainable-brand.html; Jena McGregor, Creating a class of ‘do good’ compa-
nies, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
2013/09/20/creating-a-class-of-do-good companies/?c507522e8003. 
44 James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits. 
45 McGregor, supra note 44; See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 5, 10–12, 14 (2012). 
412          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [Vol. 19 
 
wanted to engage in actions like considering the environment or provid-
ing a livable wage, the mindset is that these are actions that should be 
taken by a benefit corporation, not a traditional corporation.46  
Key decision makers at traditional corporations already must 
consider the potential legal implications of engaging in corporate social 
responsibility activity because of the unclear legality of the doctrine of 
maximizing shareholder wealth for corporations.47 eBay and other similar 
cases likely provide some concern for advisors and decision makers in 
traditional corporations when those corporations decide to engage in 
socially responsible activities that could be construed as not maximizing 
shareholder wealth.48 As states continue to adopt benefit corporation 
statutes and grow in popularity, decision makers at traditional corpora-
tions will likely become increasingly concerned about advising a corpora-
tion to engage in any behavior that could be interpreted as not maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth.49 This is because regardless of the actual legal 
implications of traditional corporations and benefit corporations, from a 
business and societal standpoint, it appears as though traditional corpo-
rations should not engage in any behavior that does not maximize share-
holder wealth, as traditional corporations are not the proper entity for 
such actions or considerations.50  
If traditional corporations severely limit socially responsible be-
havior, this could dramatically reduce the positive impact that corpora-
tions have and would likely curb any further growth in socially responsi-
ble behavior. For example, many traditional corporations currently use 
the buy one, give one model made popular by TOM’s Shoes, Inc., in 
which TOM’s gives away a pair of shoes to someone who could not oth-
                                                      
46 See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 10–12. 
47 Johnson, supra note 3, at 405, 439–40, 444–451 (2013); Chu, supra note 3, at 155, 163–
181 (2012). 
48 Id. 
49 See West, supra note 4, at 1, 2, 10–12. 
50 See id.  
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erwise afford them.51 However, as benefit corporations become more 
prevalent, and if legal questions still remain with respect to requiring a 
traditional corporation to always maximize shareholder wealth, corporate 
decision makers will likely become more concerned with non-profit max-
imizing behavior, which will result in less corporations “doing good.”  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The specific requirements of state statutes allowing for benefit 
corporations and the view of the purpose of benefit corporations es-
poused by business and scholarly publications, combined with the educa-
tion received in business and law schools reinforces the idea that tradi-
tional corporations exist only to maximize shareholder wealth.52 This re-
inforcement, coupled with the questions from case law surrounding 
whether traditional corporations must always maximize shareholder 
wealth, will likely lead to a decrease in traditional corporations engaging 
in socially responsible behavior.53 
                                                      
51 John Converse Townsend, A Better Way To 'Buy One, Give One', FORBES (Oct. 8, 
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/10/08/a-better-way-to-buy-one-
give-one/#39cece7a485e. 
52 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1-502(a)(2); Schiller, supra note 40. 
53 Johnson, supra note 3, at 405, 439–40, 444–451 (2013). 
